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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78~2a-3(2) (f) (1996) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS QF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court, in the course of taking Mr.

Powell's guilty plea, strictly complied with the requirements
set forth in Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e).

W1

[T]he

ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied
with the constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of
a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for
correctness.'"

State

v. Benvenuto,

1999) (quoting State v. Holland,
In accordance with State

983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah
921 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1996)).

v. Marvin,

964 P.2d 313 (Utah 1998),

this Court can review Defendant's guilty plea for plain error or
exceptional circumstances.

Id. at 318 (citing State

v.

740 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (citing State v. Norton,
P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983); State v. Steggell,
6

Gibbons,
675

660 P.2d 252, 254

(Utah 1983)); see also

State

v. Price,

837 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah

Ct. App. 1992); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah
1993); State v. Archambeau,

820 P.2d 920, 922-23 (Utah Ct. App.

1991) .
2.

Whether the sentencing judge plainly erred by

violating Article 1, § 7, of the Utah Constitution and Utah Rule
of Criminal Procedure 22(a) in the course of sentencing Mr.
Powell.

The sentencing judge's errors are reviewable for plain

error or exceptional circumstances.

See State

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d

1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993); State v. Archambeau,

820 P.2d 920,

922-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules,
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative,
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant.
STATEMENT QF THE CASE
This case involves the question of whether the trial court,
in the course of taking Mr. Powell's guilty plea, strictly
complied with the requirements set forth in Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(e).

Because of the trial court's failure

7

to strictly comply with those requirements, as set forth below,
Mr. Powell's guilty plea was not voluntary.
On February 22, 1999, Defendant, Daniel B. Powell, was
charged with Retaliation Against Witness or Informant, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2), a third degree
felony.

Mr. Powell pleaded not guilty.

On May 4, 1999, Mr. Powell appeared with appointed trial
counsel for a hearing on a change of plea.

During that hearing,

the district court granted the State's request to amend the
information to Attempted Retaliation Against Witness or
Informant, a class A misdemeanor, after which a brief exchange
ensued concerning the change of plea.
On October 17, 2000, the district court sentenced Mr.
Powell in absentia to one year in the county jail.

According to

the record, the district court's Sentence, Judgment, and
Commitment was entered on October 17, 2000, even though it was
not executed by the district court until October 19, 2000.
On November 13, 2 000, Mr. Powell filed his pro se Notice of
Intent to Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On February 22, 1999, Defendant, Daniel B. Powell, was

charged with Retaliation Against Witness or Informant, in

8

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508(2), a third degree felony
(See R. 4-5, Information).
2.

Mr. Powell subsequently appeared for arraignment and

pleaded not guilty (R. 18-19, Minutes of Arraignment).
3.

On May 4, 1999, Mr. Powell appeared with appointed

trial counsel for a hearing on a change of plea (R. 2 0-21,
Minutes - Change of Plea).
4.

During the hearing, the district court granted the

State's request to amend the information to Attempted
Retaliation Against Witness or Informant, a class A misdemeanor
(R. 70, Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing (05/4/99), p. 1 ) .
5.

At the change of plea hearing, the following exchange

took place:
THE COURT:

Now you've been present, Mr. Powell, as
I explained the rights that Mr.
Bradshaw had in this court, number 14
on the calendar. Did you hear me do
that?

MR. POWELL:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Did you understand those rights?

MR. POWELL:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

You understand they apply to you just
as they did to Mr. Bradshaw?

MR. POWELL:

Yes, sir.

9

THE COURT:

You understand if you enter a plea of
guilty to this amended charge that you
will be giving up those rights?

MR, POWELL:

Yes, sir.

•k

(See

id.
6.

ic

-k

"k ic

at R. 70, pp. 1-2).
On October 17, 2000, the district court sentenced Mr.

Powell in absentia pursuant to Mr. Powell's Consent to
Sentencing in Absentia (R. 41-42, Consent to Sentencing in
Absentia). The district court sentenced Mr. Powell to one year
in the county jail, which sentence "is to run consecutive

with

the charges in Case #991700002 (R. 43-44, Minutes - Sentence,
Judgment, Commitment (Emphasis added)).
7.

The district court's Sentence, Judgment, and

Commitment, according to the Certified Copy of the Docket in the
record, was entered on October 17, 2000, even though the
Judgment was not executed by the district court until October
19, 2000
8.

(Id.).
On November 13, 2000, Mr. Powell filed his pro se

Notice of Intent to Appeal (R. 48-49, Notice of Intent to
Appeal).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court committed plain error in the instant

case by failing to personally establish on the record that Mr.
Powell understood the constitutional rights that he waived by
pleading guilty.

Although the trial court generally referred to

a waiver of constitutional rights by pleading guilty, it failed
to specifically and personally discuss with Mr. Powell each of
those constitutional rights as they apply to Mr. Powell to
ensure a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its
consequences.

Because the trial court failed to inform Mr.

Powell of his constitutional rights, the trial court also
necessarily failed to determine whether the guilty plea was
voluntarily made.
The trial court also failed to make the requisite inquiry
and finding that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk of conviction.

This requirement is

of particular import in the instant case because Mr. Powell
refused to admit culpability or plead guilty to the elements of
the crime.
In addition to the plain and mandatory language of Rule
11(e), the obviousness of the trial court's errors are
demonstrated by the numerous cases addressing Rule 11(e).
Consequently, it should have been obvious that the failure to
11

specifically inform Mr. Powell of his constitutional rights
prior to any waiver and the failure to establish a substantial
risk of conviction constituted plain error.
Because the trial court failed, among other things, to
inform Mr. Powell of his constitutional rights and because the
trial court failed to obtain a waiver of those constitutional
rights, Mr. Powell was not fully informed of the consequences of
his plea and his plea therefore cannot be considered voluntary.
Inasmuch as the guilty plea was involuntary the trial court's
errors were prejudicial to Mr. Powell.
2.

Rule 22(a) unequivocally directs the sentencing court

to "afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and
to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to
show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed" before
imposing sentence.

Moreover, the due process clause of Article

1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a
sentencing judge act on reasonably reliable and relevant
information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence.
Before imposing sentence, the court heard from neither
defense counsel nor the prosecutor concerning any information in
mitigation of punishment or any other information material to
the imposition of sentence.

Further, at no time during the

sentencing hearing did the court reference the Presentence
12

Investigation Report, which had been previously prepared for the
very purpose of sentencing.
By not affording either defense counsel or the prosecutor
the opportunity of presenting information material to the
imposition of sentence, the trial court committed plain error.
Based on the plain and clear language of Article 1, § 7, of the
Utah Constitution, and Utah case law, the errors committed by
the sentencing judge was obvious.

Finally, the sentencing

judge's errors were prejudicial to Mr. Powell inasmuch as both
he, through counsel, and the prosecutor were precluded from
presenting information prior to sentencing, which is a critical
stage of the criminal proceedings.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING
TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE
11 IN THE COURSE OF TAKING MR. POWELL'S GUILTY
PLEA.
A.

The Trial Court's Rule 11 Duty of Strict
Compliance.

Rule 11 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
"'squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and Rule 11 (e) requirements are complied with
when a guilty plea is entered. "'

State

v. Benvenuto,

556, 558 (Utah 1999) (quoting State v. Gibbons,

13

983 P.2d

740 P.2d 1309,

1312 (Utah 1987) ) .

The trial court must strictly adhere to the

requirements of Rule 11(e).
372 (Utah 1996).
in Boykin

v.

See State

v.

Thurman,

911 P.2d 371,

The basis of the trial court's duty is found

Alabama,

395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969), where

the United States Supreme Court stated:

"What is at stake for

an accused facing [punishment] demands the utmost solicitude of
which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the
plea connotes and of its consequence."

Id.

at 243-44, 89 S.Ct.

at 1712-13.
In State v.

Pharris,

798 P.2d 772 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),

this Court stated:
Under the . . . strict compliance test,
before accepting the guilty plea, the trial court
must review on the record with the defendant at
the time the plea is taken the nature and
elements of the offense, the constitutional
rights articulated in Rule 11 which he waives by
pleading guilty, and the allowable penalties.
Id.

at 778.

"The trial judge bears the burden of establishing,

on the record, strict compliance with Rule 11(e)."
Penman,

State v.

964 P.2d 1157, 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

Rule 11(e) mandates the following:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill,
and may not accept the plea until the court has
found:

14

(1) if the defendant is not represented by
counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right
to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the
presumption of innocence, the right against
compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the
right to confront and cross-examine in open court
the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel
the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by
entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which the plea is
entered, that upon trial the prosecution would
have the burden of proving each of those elements
beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A
factual basis is sufficient if it establishes
that the charged crime was actually committed by
the defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is
otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish
a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum
mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that
may be imposed for each offense to which a plea
is entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior
plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so,
what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw the
plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right
of appeal is limited.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e).

15

B.

Review for Plain Error or Exceptional
Circumstances.

Notwithstanding a defendant's failure to timely file a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, this Court, in accordance with
State

v.

Marvin,

964 P.2d 313 (Utah 1998), can review

Defendant's guilty plea for plain error or exceptional
circumstances.

Id.

at

318 (citing State

1309, 1311 (Utah 1987) (citing State v.
581 (Utah 1983); State v.
1983)); State v. Price,
see also

State

as to result

Gibbons,

Norton,

SIS

740 P.2d
P.2d 577,

660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah

837 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);

v. Ostler,
only,

Steggell,

v.

2000 UT App 28, 996 P.2d 1065,

2001 UT 69, f13.

aff'd

To prevail on a claim of

plain error, a defendant has the burden of showing u(i) An error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for
the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the
verdict is undermined.
(Utah 1993); see also
Portillo,
Tenney,
v.

Verde,

State
Marvin,

v.

Dunn,

850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09

964 P.2d at 318; State

v.

914 P.2d 724, 726 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); and State v.
913 P.2d 750 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

According to

State

770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989), in most

circumstances, the term "manifest injustice" found in Utah R.

16

Crim. P. 19(c) is synonymous with the "plain error" standard
expressly set forth in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d).
C.

The Trial Court Failed to Personally Establish
Mr. Powell's Understanding of his Constitutional
Rights and Obtain a Waiver of those Rights.

The trial court committed plain error in the instant case
by failing to personally establish on the record that Mr. Powell
understood the constitutional rights that he waived by pleading
guilty.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3).

At the change of plea

hearing in the instant case, the following exchange took place:
THE COURT:

Now you've been present, Mr. Powell, as
I explained the rights that Mr.
Bradshaw had in this court, number 14
on the calendar. Did you hear me do
that?

MR, POWELL:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

Did you understand those rights?

MR. POWELL:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

You understand they apply to you just
as they did to Mr. Bradshaw?

MR. POWELL:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT:

You understand if you enter a plea of
guilty to this amended charge that you
will be giving up those rights?

MR. POWELL:

Yes, sir.

* * * * *
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(See R. 70, Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing (05/4/99), pp.
1-2) .
Although the trial court generally referred to a waiver of
constitutional rights by pleading guilty, it failed to
specifically discuss each of those constitutional rights as they
apply to Mr. Powell to ensure a full understanding of what the
plea connotes and its consequences.
1312 (quoting Boykin
1712-13 (1969)).

v. Alabama,

See Gibbons,

740 P.2d at

395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct.

In light of the trial court's duty to canvass

the rights set forth in Rule 11, it is insufficient to permit a
guilty plea to be entered against a defendant by allowing the
trial court to merely refer to a discussion of constitutional
rights that took place in another proceeding with another
defendant.

Id.

at 1313 (quoting Henderson

v. Morgan,

637, 659, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 2260 (1976)); see also
Valencia,

State

426 U.S.
v.

776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam)

(stating that "[sjpecific inquiry should be made as to whether
defendant understands that by his plea he waived his rights
against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, to appeal, and to
confront witnesses.").

18

D.

The Trial Court Failed to Determine that Mr.
Powell's Plea was Voluntarily Made,

Because the trial court failed to inform Mr. Powell of his
constitutional rights, the trial court also necessarily failed
to determine whether the guilty plea was voluntarily made.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2).

See

The conclusory assertions made by

the trial court that Mr. Powell entered the guilty plea of his
"own free will and choice and knowingly" are insufficient under
Rule 11(e)(2).

See Valencia,

116 P.2d at 1335.

Because " [a]

guilty plea cannot be voluntary if it is uninformed,"
defendant's guilty plea was involuntary.

State v.

Breckenridge,

688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983).
E,

The Trial Court Failed to Determine That There
Was Sufficient Evidence to Establish a
Substantial Risk of Conviction.

The trial court also failed to make the requisite inquiry
and finding that the prosecution had sufficient evidence to
establish a substantial risk of conviction.
P. 11(e)(4)(B); see

See Utah R. Crim.

688 P.2d at 444 (ux [B]ecause a

Breckenridge,

guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal
criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the
defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to
the facts.'"
United

States,

(alteration in original) (quoting McCarthy

v.

394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171 (1969)

19

(footnote omitted)); see also

Valencia,

776 P.2d at 1335

(stating that a defendant's "understanding of the elements of
the charges and the relationship of the law and the facts may
not be presumed from silent or incomplete examination.").
This requirement is of particular import in the instant
case inasmuch as Mr. Powell refused to admit culpability or
plead guilty to the elements of the crime (See R. 70, Transcript
of Change of Plea Hearing (05/4/99), pp. 3-4). In light of Mr.
Powell's refusal, the trial court was required to inquire
further about the dispute concerning the evidence to be provided
by the prosecution at trial and then determine if there was
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
conviction.
P.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B).
The Errors Committed in the Course of Taking
Mr. Powell's Guilty Plea Should Have Been
Obvious to the Trial Court.

Based on the plain and well-settled Rule 11(e) strict
compliance standard that governs the taking of guilty pleas, the
trial court committed obvious error when it failed to inform Mr.
Powell of his constitutional rights to be waived by a guilty
plea.

Moreover, the trial court plainly erred when it failed to

inquire and make the requisite finding that the prosecution had
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of
conviction.

In addition to the plain and mandatory language of
20

Rule 11(e), the obviousness of the trial court's errors are
demonstrated by the numerous cases addressing Rule 11 (e) .
Consequently, it should have been obvious that the failure to
specifically inform Mr. Powell of his constitutional rights
prior to any waiver and the failure to establish a substantial
risk of conviction constituted plain error.
G.

The Trial Court's Errors Prejudiced Mr. Powell.

The constitutional rights set forth in Rule 11(e) (3) are
among those u'constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial
that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error.'"
Holloway

v. Arkansas,

435 U.S. 475, 489, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1181

(1978) (quoting Chapman v. California,
824, 837 (1967)).

386 U.S. 18, 43, 87 S.Ct.

Because the trial court failed, among other

things, to inform Mr. Powell of his constitutional rights and
because the trial court failed to obtain a waiver of those
constitutional rights, Mr. Powell was not fully informed of the
consequences of his plea and his plea therefore cannot be
considered voluntary.

See State

v. Smith,

(Utah 1989); State v. Breckenridge,
1983); and State v. Pharris,
1990).

111 P.2d 464, 466

688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah

798 P.2d 772, 778 (Utah Ct. App.

Inasmuch as the guilty plea was involuntary the trial

court's errors were prejudicial to Mr. Powell.

21

See State

v.

Ostler,

2000 UT App 28, 996 P.2d 1065, aff'd

as to result

only,

2001 UT 69, f26.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MR. POWELL'S
CONSITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND UTAH RULE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22(a) IN THE COURSE OF
SENTENCING MR. POWELL.

The second paragraph of Rule 22 (a) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure states:
Before imposing sentence the court
shall afford the defendant an opportunity to
make a statement and to present any
information in mitigation of punishment, or
to show any legal cause why sentence should
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney
shall also be given an opportunity to
present any information material to the
imposition of sentence.
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).

Because Mr. Powell was involuntarily

absent and unable to personally attend his sentencing, he did
not waive the right to make a statement at sentencing or present
information in mitigation of punishment or to show legal cause
why sentence should not be imposed.
P.2d 1107, 1111 (Utah 1996); see

also

Cf.

State

State

v.

v.

Anderson,

Casarez,

92 9

656 P.2d

1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) (holding that *[s]entencing is a critical
stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled
to the effective assistance of counsel77) .
Rule 22(a) unequivocally directs the sentencing court to
''afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to
22

present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show
any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed" before
imposing sentence.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).

Moreover,

u

[t]he due process clause of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah

Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on reasonably
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in
fixing a sentence/7
1985); see also

State

State

v. Howell,

v. McClendon,

707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah
611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah

1980) (discussing consideration of defendant's background and
crime committed for sentence to be appropriate and to serve the
interests of society); State

v. Lipsky,

608 P.2d 1241, 1249

(Utah 1980) (requiring disclosure of presentence report to
defendant prior to sentencing).
At sentencing in this case, the sentencing judge recognized
that Mr. Powell was involuntarily absent (See R. 70, Sentencing
Transcript (10/17/00), p. 1); see also
Sentencing in Absentia).

R. 41-42, Consent to

After briefing discussing Mr. Powell's

involuntary absence and the consent to sentencing in absentia,
the sentencing judge then proceeded to impose sentence (See R.
70, Sentencing Transcript (10/17/00), pp. 1-3). Before imposing
sentence, the court heard from neither defense counsel nor the
prosecutor concerning "any information in mitigation of
punishment" or "any [other] information material to the
23

imposition of sentence."

See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a).

Further,

at no time during the sentencing hearing did the court reference
the Presentence Investigation Report, which had been previously
prepared for the very purpose of sentencing (See R. 73-94,
Presentence Investigation Report).

By not providing the

prosecutor the opportunity to present information material to
sentencing, the sentencing judge precluded the prosecutor from
recommending that Mr. Powell's sentence in this case run
concurrent with the sentence in Mr. Powell's other case as
represented by prosecutor in the course of plea negotiations
(See R. 70, Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing (5/7/99), pp.
4-5).

In fact, the sentence imposed by the court was

consecutive (See R. 43-44, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment).
By not affording either defense counsel or the prosecutor
the opportunity of presenting information material to the
imposition of sentence, the trial court committed plain error.
To prevail on a claim of plain error, as previously discussed
above, a defendant must show "(i) An error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is
undermined.

State

v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
24

Based on the plain and clear language of Rule 22(a),
Article 1, § 7, of the Utah Constitution, and Utah case law, the
errors committed by the sentencing judge were obvious.
State

v.

Wanosik,

2001 UT App 241, ff27-36.

Cf.

Finally, the

sentencing judge's errors were prejudicial to Mr. Powell
inasmuch as both he, through counsel, and the prosecutor were
precluded from presenting information prior to sentencing, which
is a critical stage of the criminal proceedings.

A likelihood

of a more favorable result or sentence for Mr. Powell is
demonstrated by the prosecutor's recommendation concerning a
concurrent sentence that was supposed to be made to the court as
represented during plea negotiations.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Powell respectfully requests
that this Court vacate his conviction obtain by way of the
invalid guilty plea and remand the case for further proceedings
and for such other relief as the Court deems just and
appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

a

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of December, 2001.
lGGINS, P.C.
s£Tns

Attorneys^fc^r Appellant
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Tab A

2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991700300 FS

DANIEL BEFAKADU POWELL,
Defendant.
Custody: Bail

Judge:
Date:

RODNEY S. PAGE
October 17, 2000

PRESENT
Clerk:
glendap
Prosecutor: WEST, JUDITH
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): CELLA, GLEN T
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 25, 1966
Video
Tape Number:
10/17/00
Tape Count: 2.30
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED TAMPER W/ WITNESS/JUROR (amended) - Class A
Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/04/1999 {Guilty Plea}
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED TAMPER W/
WITNESS/JUROR a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to
a term of 3 65 day(s)

Page 1

G0043

Case No: 991700300
Date:
Oct 17, 2000
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
This is to run consecutive with the charges in Case #991700002.
This charge is to run concurrent with the federal sentence and to
be served in the federal prison.
Consent to Sentencing in Absentia is filed.
federal custody in Pennsylvania.
Dated t h i s

]<$*< d a y of

Oc^r

Defendant is in

' 20 CrQ .

R6SNEY_^. PAGE

D i s t r i c t Court Judge

Page 2 (last)

G0044

TabB

1

FARMINGTON, UTAH - MAY 4, 1999

2

HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4
5

THE COURT:

is the time set for sentence.

6
7

State of Utah v. Daniel B, Powell, this

MR. CELLA:

Your Honor, can we address the pretrial

conference first and then the sentencing?

8

THE COURT:

We can.

9

MR. CELLA:

Ifm going to ask the Court to amend the

10

only cpunt to attempted tampering which is a class A

11

misdemeanor and then enter a plea guilty to the amended charge.

12

MR. MCGUIRE:

13

THE COURT:

14

Court will amend the information then to

attempted retaliation, a class A misdemeanor.

15
16

That is correct, your Honor.

Do you have any objection to the amendment, Mr.
Powell?

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE COURT:

No, sir.

As amended that becomes a class A

19

misdemeanor, which alleges that you attempted to communicate to

20

a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe to be

21

a threat to do bodily injury to the person because of any act

22

performed or to be performed by the person in his capacity as a

23

witness, informant or in an official proceeding or

24

investigation.

25 J

Now you've been present, Mr. Powell, as I explained
1

1

the rights that Mr. Bradshaw had in this court, number 14 on

2

the calendar.

Did you hear me do that?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

7

Yes, sir.

Did you understand those rights?
Yes, sir.

You understand they apply to you just as

they did to Mr. Bradshaw?

8

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

9

THE COURT:

You understand if you enter a plea of

10

guilty to this amended charge that you will be giving up those

11

rights?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

You understand if you plead guilty there

14

will be no trial and no witnesses will be called and that

15

you'll be relieving the prosecutor of proving this attempted

16

retaliation against a witness or informant because you will be

17

admitting that charge.

Do you understand those things?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

THE COURT:

I understand, your Honor.

The Court would inform you, Mr. Powell,

20

that once you've entered a guilty plea, your right to appeal is

21

limited.

22

you could take as of right is as to whether or not you entered

23

the guilty plea of your own free will and choice.

24

understand that?

25

And once that guilty plea is entered, the only appeal

THE DEFENDANT:

Do you

I understand, Your Honor.

1

THE COURT:

Now in order to convict you of this

2

charge, the State would have to prove the following things

3

beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously to a jury.

4

would have to show that you were in Davis County on March 19,

5

1999.

6

communicate to a person a threat that a reasonable person would

7

believe to be a threat to do bodily injury to that person

8

because of any act performed or to be performed by the person

9

in his or her capacity as a witness or an informant in an

10

official proceeding or investigation and that you did that

11

knowingly and intentionally.

12

elements of this particular charge.

13

elements?

They

They would have to show that you attempted to

Those are what we call the

14

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

15

THE COURT:

Do you understand those

Keeping them in mind, Mr. Powell, are you

16

entering a plea of guilty in this matter because you feel

17

you're guilty of those elements?

18

THE DEFENDANT:

It would be more accurate to say is

19

that I'm pleading guilty to take advantage of the plea bargain

20

to a misdemeanor crime;

21

MR. MCGUIRE:

22

THE COURT:

correct?
That's correct, your Honor.

You have a right to do that, Mr. Powell,

23

so long as you understand that if you wanted to you could put

24

the State to their prove on the original charge.

25

understand that?

Do you

3

1

THE DEFENDANT:

2

THE COURT:

Yesf sir.

And with that understanding is it your

3

desire to take advantage of a more favorable charge and enter a

4

plea of guilty to that?

5

THE DEFENDANT:

6

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

You understand as a class A misdemeanor

7

this carries a possible penalty of up to one year in the county

8

jail and a fine of up to $2,500?

9
10
11
12
13
14

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

I understand, sir.

Has anyone promised you what sentence I

would impose?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

They have just suggested

that it would be run concurrent with my other charges.
THE COURT:

That is a possibility, but you need to

15

recognize that that is not a guarantee, and when it comes to

16

sentence, that issue would be left to the court.

17

understand that?

18

THE DEFENDANT: I understand.

19

MR. CELLA:

Do you

Let me state that I made that

20

representation to him and that's because Mr. McGuire made that

21

representation to me that he would recommend concurrent on this

22

case with the sentence to be imposed on the other case.

23
24

THE COURT:

He may make that recommendation, but Mr.

Powell needs to understand that I am not bound by any

25 I recommendations of either defense counsel or of the state's
4

1

counsel.

2

Do you understand that, Mr. Powell?
THE DEFENDANT:

I understand that.

Can I ask my

3

attorney a question?

4

THE COURT:

You certainly may.

5

MR. CELLA:

He asked me for my opinion on whether or

6

not you would, and I said I thought it likely.

7

THE COURT:

Generally, they are run concurrent, but

8

you need to understand that that is not a guarantee, Mr.

9

Powell.

10

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

11

THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any drugs

12

or alcohol, now being treated for any mental illness or taking

13

any prescribed medication?

14

THE DEFENDANT:

15

THE COURT: And what do you take?

16

THE DEFENDANT: Hydrocodone for pain, sir.

17

THE COURT:

18
19
20
21
22

I take prescribed medications, sir.

Is that any way interfere with your

ability to understand what's going on here today?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir, I'm completely cognitive of
what's going on here.
THE COURT:

Are there any questions you wish to ask

Mr. Cella or myself about this plea before we go further?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE COURT:

No, sir.

Mr. McGuire, what are the facts that

25 j would support a guilty plea?
5

1

MR. MCGUIRE:

2

was before this court on a trial.

3

testified.

4

contact with the officer outside the courtroom and told the

5

officer that he would see him again on some dark night.

6

demeanor of the defendant and the circumstances surrounding

7

that statement lead the officer to believe that it was a threat

8

against him.

9
10
11

Your Honor, on March 19, the defendant
During that trial an officer

After the trial was over the defendant came in

THE COURT:

The

Mr. Cella, are those the facts that you

think the state would present in this matter?
MR. CELLA:

They are, your Honor, and Mr. Powell

12

admits making the statement, but his position was that when he

13

first came into contact with the officer, it was also a dark

14

night, so he doesn't think - he didn't make it in his point,

15

from his point of reference with the threat in a reckless

16

[inaudible] statute, but is willing to plead guilty to take

17

advantage of the plea.

18

THE COURT:

The Court will find that those facts

19

would support a plea of guilty in this matter as amended.

20

Court will ask you then, having explained your rights to you,

21

Mr. Powell, is it still your desire to enter a plea of guilty

22

to this amended charge?

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

proposed arrangements I would, sir.

25 J

THE COURT:

The

Yes, sir, to take advantage of the

And to the charge of attempted
6

1

retaliation against a witness or informant, a class A

2

misdemeanor, what is your plea?

3

THE DEFENDANT:

4

THE COURT:

Guilty or not guilty?

Guilty, your Honor.

I will find that you entered a guilty

5

plea, that you've done so of your own free will and choice and

6

knowingly.

7

others, Mr. Powell, that you have 30 days in which you could

8

ask to withdraw the guilty plea.

9

won't let you do it just because you change your mind.

You'd

10

have to show good cause and then it would be up to me.

Do you

11

understand that?

The Court will inform you as you've heard me inform

12

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

13

THE COURT:

That's not automatic.

I

You also have a right to be sentenced in

14

not less than two nor more than 45 days.

15

right and ask for a pre-sentence report. What is your desire,

16

Mr. Cella?

17
18

MR. CELLA:

You may waive that

We do need the pre-sentence report. We

would ask that he also be referred on 991700002.

19

THE COURT:

We'll find that the defendant has waived

20

his right to be sentenced within the statutory time on this

21

matter.

22

Parole for a pre-sentence report.

23

in case number 991700002 the defendant has failed to report to

24

adult probation and parole.

We'll refer the defendant to Adult Probation and
The Court further notes that

The Court, however, will give him

25 I the opportunity to be re-referred on that matter, and will
7

refer him on that matter also based upon his plea of guilty to
I think it was - or his finding of guilty, possession of a
dangerous weapon, use of drug paraphernalia, and illegal use or
possession of controlled substance.

He's to be referred on

those matters also and it will come back to the court for the
purposes of sentence on the 8th of June, 1999.
you need to be back here on that date.

So Mr. Powell,

Do I have your word do

that?
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Are you still residing in Wyoming?

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

That will be the order of the Court then.

We'll see you back on that date.
MR. CELLA:

I'm sorry, could we go to the 15th

instead of the 8th for him?
THE COURT:

I have no problem with that.

here and she'll take that referral.

Set an appointment for

you.
THE DEFENDANT:

Thank you, your Honor.

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)
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Ms. Hugo is

TabC

1

FARMINGTON, UTAH - OCTOBER 17, 2000

2

HONORABLE RODNEY S. PAGE PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

5

is the time set for sentencing.

6

this matter.

7

State of Utah v. Daniel B. Powell. This
A warrant is outstanding in

Has that been served yet?

MR. CELLA:

Do we know?

It has been served, your Honor.

On this

8

case, I spoke with Mr. McGuire a couple of weeks ago. Mr.

9

Powell is in federal custody in Pennsylvania, I believe, and I

10

spoke with Mr. McGuire about getting him sentenced in

11

abstention and allow it to run concurrent.

12

willingness to do so.

13

get something from him in writing and it should be in the file

14

now, giving a notarized consent to allow sentencing to proceed

15

in his absence.

16

THE COURT:

He indicated a

You, I spoke with you and you .said let's

I do have the consent to sentencing in

17

absentiate.

It is signed by Mr. Powell and notarized on the

18

26th of September of this year.

19

MR. CELLA:

It sets forth his earliest release date,

20

which my recollection is 2004, I think.

21

sentencing today and allow it to run current with his federal

22

commitment in Pennsylvania.

23

THE COURT:

I would ask for

Based upon the pre-sentence report that

24

was previously prepared in this matter, the Court will sentence

25

the defendant to one year in the county jail on the tampering
1

with a witness charge.

I will suspend all of the fine.

I will

sentence him to six months in the county jail on possession of
paraphernalia and possession of controlled substance.

The

Court will order that the two class B misdemeanors are to run
concurrent and that the class A misdemeanor is to run
consecutive to the class B misdemeanors.

The Court will order

that they all run concurrent with his present prison sentence.
MR. MCGUIRE:
MR. CELLA:

Thank you, judge.

And with that, is the Court willing to

release its hold?
THE COURT:

I am.

MR. CELLA:

Letfs see.

I think that, your Honor,

there's also a Mr. Powell, there's also a third degree, the
possession of a handgun by a restricted person.
THE COURT:

Looks like we do have another one.

MR. CELLA:

He was convicted of counts 1, 2 and 3 and

4 were dismissed.
THE COURT:

That's right.

MR. CELLA:

Found not guilty.

THE COURT:

I think we need to redo this to clarify

that sentence in the matter so it's done appropriately.

Let's

look first of all, in the sentence first of all in the case of
991700002.

In that matter, the defendant plead guilty to the

charge of possession of dangerous weapon, a third degree
felony.

And on that case, the Court will sentence the

1

defendant to zero to five years in the state prison.

2

suspend all of the fine.

3

concurrent with his federal sentence.

4

I will

I will order that that time to run

In case number 991700300, the Court will sentence the

5

defendant - excuse me, on 002 there was also a class B

6

misdemeanor of paraphernalia and a class B misdemeanor of

7

possession charge, as I understand.

8

MR. CELLA:

That's correct.

9

THE COURT:

Is that correct?

10

MR. CELLA:

That's correct. And those are guilty

11
12

verdicts from a trial, your Honor.
THE COURT:

That's right. And the Court will order

13

that those sentences, six months in the county jail on each of

14

the two counts are to run concurrent with each other and

15

concurrent with the third degree felony.

16

MR. CELLA:

Thank you.

17

THE COURT:

Due to the nature of the offense of

18

tampering with a witness occurring specifically on - involving

19

threats made to a state trooper, in case number 00300, the

20

Court will sentence the defendant to one year in the county

21

jail, suspend all of the fine, and order that that run

22

consecutive to the third degree felony charge. All sentences

23

to run concurrent with the federal offense.

24

MR. CELLA:

Okay, thank you, your Honor.

25

THE COURT: All right.

26

(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)

